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Viet Nam:
A Challenge to United States Foreign Policy

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COMMISSION A

The United States objectives in South Vietnam should be to create a situation conducive to stability through (a) removing the threat of the Viet Cong and (b) establishing a political, social, and economical climate which would enable the South Vietnamese to choose their own direction.

To achieve these objectives we recommend increasing military activity to the degree that it is effective and necessary. Recognizing that the struggle will be lengthy, we advise expanded action in the following directions:

A. Step up air attacks on strategic military positions, staging points, and lines of communication, transportation, and supply. The bombing of industrial positions would be reserved in case of further escalation of the war. The purpose of these strengthened air attacks is to harass the Viet Cong; therefore, the degree and timing of these attacks is to be determined by responsible officials in the field.

B. Increase ground operations realizing that they will become more effective as we learn more about guerrilla tactics. To insure the effectiveness of these operations, the equipment used must be both adequate and of the most suitable nature. The following are specific recommendations to achieve these ends:

1. Intensive training for the South Vietnamese, in both combat techniques and infiltration methods, is vital. We believe that well-trained South Vietnamese can be the most effective fighting force possible in this context. This might pave the way for their eventual self-sufficiency. In addition we want to increase the numbers of Vietnamese troops.

2. We advise the increase of American Special Forces in South Vietnam to be employed in both combat and advisory capacities.

3. We propose that a new sector of the military be sent into the villages to aid in all aspects of local development and to double as security guards. It is hoped that this will instill nationalistic spirit and limit the scope of Viet Cong activities.

To implement the second part of our objectives requires policies which extend beyond military considerations. A prime consideration is the need for a stable government which entails: (a) the ability to maintain law and order, (b) the capacity to solve internal problems, and (c) a responsiveness to nationalist aspirations. (The latter would not necessitate a democratic form of government.) In reaching this aim, we should foster pro-Western sentiment wherever possible; however, we should not superimpose Western institutions on their present political structure. We assist them in establishing institutions that are geared to their specific internal problems and background. This political stability will be aided by education with special emphasis on the following three programs:

COMMISSION A -- Continued

A. A two part training program for American personnel going into South Vietnam. For technical advisors intensive instruction in the language, customs, and social habits of the South Vietnamese will be required. Other personnel should receive a program which would familiarize them with the same material but would be less intensive because of the time limitations.

B. A training program organized by the Saigon government for Vietnamese administrative leaders which would be encouraged and aided by the United States. Primary aims of this program would be to foster understanding of rural problems and to establish a rapport between Saigon and the rural areas.

C. The education of the people. The public educational system is necessary. But because of limits imposed by the war, we should first improve the existing system as much as possible.

Recognizing that a sound economic system is necessary for stability, we recommend the following:

A. Since the products of South Vietnam are primarily agricultural, this should be the area of our greatest concentration. We believe that increased productivity would best exploit South Vietnam's comparative advantage in agriculture, and this should be done by the education of the peasantry and the introduction of modern farming techniques where possible. While we do believe that land redistribution and people relocation would be desirable security-wise, it would not be sound at this time for political and economic reasons.

B. To implement a more effective market structure, we believe that an improved system of roads would facilitate military and economic traffic flow. We believe that this coupled with aids to monetization in rural areas would lead to greater economic exchange.

C. Once a more sophisticated market system has been developed the expansion of industry would be possible. For South Vietnam this will mean primarily small-scale, consumer type industry. Any capital good production will be of the type that can be integrated into labor-intensive industrialization. United States surpluses can be employed to facilitate the movement of labor from rural to industrial pursuits.

D. It is necessary to the economic development of South Vietnam to have monetary help from external sources. There can be two main sources of this inflow, which are (a) private investments which can be encouraged through tax-concessions and government guarantees, and (b) foreign aid which should take the form of long-range, soft loans. Coupled with this we believe that United States appropriations should be made on a long range basis, thereby eliminating the uncertainties of yearly appropriations.

Because of the complexities of this development plan, it will be necessary to co-ordinate the public and private sectors in achieving a balanced growth.

COMMISSION B

It is the opinion of this commission that the general objectives of United States' foreign policy must be based upon the following criteria; 1) self-preservation, 2) security, 3) national interest, 4) containment of Communism, and 5) world order and the establishment of higher standards of living.

The following proposed foreign policy for Viet-Nam we believe to be consistent and with these criteria:

I. Military

Objective: The permanent elimination of Viet-Cong military activity below (south of) the 17th parallel.

Method: To maintain our present pressure on North Viet-Nam while increasing our internal military operations in South Viet-Nam with the aim of negotiation. We will continue our present air attacks and assist to increase the South-Vietnamese forces with a proportional increase in American advisors.

II. Economic

Objective: To create an atmosphere conducive to a prosperous progressive and solvent economic and monetary system in South Viet-Nam.

Method: To encourage economic development by the South-Vietnamese through financial aid and research and technical assistance as requested directly from the United States through joint cooperation of the South Viet-Nameese government and United States Administrators. A three stage plan for this development would be: 1) the revitalization of agricluture through technical aid, experts, and physical improvements, 2) the creation of light industries, designed primarily but not exclusively to lend emphasis to agricultural improvements, 3) the encouragement of investments with the objective of developing natural resources, and implementing the establishment of industrial projects. A hydro-electric dam across the Mekong River delta would dofinitely promote economic progress not only in South Viet-Nam but other nations of south-east Asia as well. We welcome economic and technical aid by other nations for South Viet-Nam.

III. Social

Objectives: To provide for the development of a healthy, well-educated, and tolerant society.

Method: The expansion of financial assistance to the development programs of South Viet-Nam, acknowledging the need for emphasis to be placed upon participation by the South Viet Nameese government. The following specific methods are recommended:

- 1) Construction of additional educational facilities--academic and vocational--and the training of additional educators.
- 2) Construction of additional locally available medical centers and hospitals, the training of more doctors, nurses, and public health specialists, and a substantially increased provision of medical supplies.
- 3) to relieve immediate conditions of food shortages through the provision of agricultural surplus from the United States.
- 4) To extend the activities of the Peace Corps and similarly organized South Viet-Nameese student groups.
- 5) The expansion of U.S.I.A. activities in South Viet Nam.

IV. Political Objective: To create an atmosphere conducive to self-determined, stable government.

Method: The United States should advocate and support a South Viet-Nameese government representing both the military and civilian elements, dedicated to the expulsion of the Viet Cong military enforcements and the promulgation of neutral or indepentdent Asian policies and founded on a popular basis. The government could be formed by negotiations on the part of military, civilian, and religious leaders, to be ratified by plebiscite and to enforce governmental policies without United States assistance (ASAS)

Minority report: Elections and negotiations should be under ASEA auspices to be carried out at a time that ASEA and the Viet Nameese government deem opportune for the South Vietnamese.

COMMISSION C

Aims: 1. To check further deterioration of the situation in South Vietnam and to strengthen our position so that a negotiated settlement would lead to a stable Vietnam, freed from external control.

2. To introduce a creative long range policy, designed to offset the success of the Viet Cong by adapting the tactics of guerilla warfare as articulated by Mao Tse Tung and Ho Chi Minh in order to undercut the ideological appeal of the Viet Cong. The theory of guerilla warfare incorporates political, economic, and social factors as well as armed conflict.

In North Vietnam Vietnamese guerillas will induce political instability by disrupting the framework of government-control through small mobile tactics which would destroy economic and military targets, and by exploiting peasant discontent with their government through propaganda and, when necessary through the judicious use of terrorism. This will force Hanoi to redirect its resources away from support of the Viet Cong to protection of its national viability and will encourage Hanoi to negotiate.

We will train Vietnamese to engage in guerilla activities in South Vietnam thus enabling them to wrest control of these areas from the Viet Cong by attracting peasant support. This will include:

a--integrating the new myth of nationalism by combining the desires and aspirations of the different ethnic groups into a nationalistic ideology and nurturing this myth through all available means, emphasizing a people-to-people approach.

b--promoting agrarian reform with regard for cultural and traditional considerations.

c--promoting an educational policy in accordance with the needs of the people. This policy would not only include technical training but would provide the foundation necessary for responsible government.

d--promoting long range economic development in South Vietnam, beginning with the development of the Mekong River Valley as a first step in the creation of an South-East Asian economic community.

Realizing that the above program will be implemented over a period of time, we propose the following interim measures: strategic bombing in the North and tactical bombing in the South; small unit conventional warfare; night patrols. These interim measures are designed to check the deterioration of our position until they are superseded by the long range program.

The commission unanimously urges enlarged academic programs in Asian studies in the United States and government grants to promote this end.

Minority Report: It is our view that the United States ought to begin negotiations in order to end the Vietnamese conflict and set up a neutral government possibly encompassing all of Vietnam. We have attempted various methods of strengthening our position and have failed each time. Therefore we should move to the conference table before our positions further deteriorates.

COMMISSION D

In establishing guidelines for our policy, we used both short and long term goals for each nation. The short range policy is for the creation of a more defensible position for the United States, militarily, politically, and legally, and for the improvement of the physical lot of the South Vietnamese people. As long range goals, we chose the establishment of a country amenable to the West and self-determination for the South Vietnamese people.

The actual policy to achieve these goals was divided into three major parts. First, we desire to supplement and improve the field advisory and security forces within South Viet Nam. Second, we wish to step up strategic bombing and interdiction against North Vietnam with the objective of forcing the end of that country's involvement. Third, along with the military program, we wish to increase economic, social, and administrative aid within South Vietnam.

Recognizing the instability of Vietnamese conditions, the policy should be reviewed periodically to determine the advisability of increasing or decreasing the scale of operations commensurate to achievement of our goals.

Minority Report

We feel that the report of this commission has failed to grasp the fundamental issues involved in Viet Nam. This policy simply continues the escalation that has existed for years and is in no way significantly different from our current futile policy. We feel that continued United States military assistance can do nothing but serve as a barrier to a government of Viet Nam by the Vietnamese. We favor immediate negotiations leading to the neutralization of South Viet Nam under the agency of the United Nations or any other acceptable body.

Minority Report

In that the United States' present policy and the similar policy formulated by this commission have proven ineffective:

1. The United States should vastly increase the number of troops in South Viet Nam.

2. If necessary to insure effective control and ultimate victory, the United States should assume control over South Viet Nam's domestic affairs.

3. The United States should send troops to and step up air attacks against North Vietnam.

4. If China militarily interferes with our operations, we should declare war and finally eliminate a threat which will only increase with time.

COMMISSION E

We propose as the General United States Objective in Southeast Asia: Containment of Communism. To implement this in South Viet Nam, the United States is determined to, (1) prevent imposition of Communism by force of arms, (2) allow people to choose their own government, (a long-range objective) and (3) be sure they are prepared to make a "responsible" choice.

As specific policy we recommend:

Military: (1) Continue non-specific air-strikes against military and strategic targets, (2) Ground: Improve advisory program by increasing the number of personnel, lengthening the tour of duty and increasing language training, (3) Commit United States combat forces, if possible to an international force, otherwise unilaterally, in whatever numbers necessary to end Communist aggression in all of South East Asia.

Political: (1) Continue training program for civil servants, (2) In order to raise morale, bolster local government, increase nationalism and allegiance to Saigon, and halt terrorism we should send out by teams to the villages a corps of trained organizers including United States cadres, and trained villagers. The program should seek the cooperation of the National Voluntary Service, should avoid relocation wherever possible, and should proceed only with the support of the local people and the central government. (3) The United States should support only pro-western governments and tolerate no neutralism, (4) We should remain flexible on recognition of coups d'etat, (5) We should support Dr. Quat as long as his regime serves United States interests and in so far as we feel he enjoys the support of the people, (6) The United States Information Agency should step up its propaganda activities throughout Southeast Asia.

Economic: This program should follow along the same line as the others proposed with progress in the following fields: (1) Agriculture: Continue land reform as rapidly as possible; create crop diversification; expand markets for foreign products; and lend technical assistance in all the above. (2) Industry: Both the United States and Vietnamese governments should support private investment; set up schools for training in executive and managerial leadership; lend technical help; and expand government public works projects. (3) Increase at the same time wherever feasible, the education and health programs as quickly as possible. This is to be done through help from Agency for International Development and with additional help on the Peace Corps level. This economic program is directed towards solving the balance of payments deficit and creating a self-sufficient economy for Vietnam.

COMMISSION "F"

Long-Range Objectives:

1. Our goal is to have a shield of active containment of Communism.
 - a. We will prove to all Asian countries our determination to fulfill our commitments.
 - b. We will aid in setting up sovereign states that will be responsive to the needs and desires of the people.
2. Our objective is to foster the development of viable states in South East Asian countries.
3. Our aim is to establish a satisfactory and peaceful relationship of independence among South East Asian countries.
4. Our objective is to attain the support of the people with whom we are dealing.
5. The ultimate goal of the United States is its national preservation.

Immediate Objectives:

1. We must stabilize the South Vietnamese government in order that it will be able to compete with North Viet-Nam and Red China.
2. In establishing a stable government in South Viet-Nam, we will strive to: a) raise the standard of living, b) develop and protect natural resources, c) develop a more favorable balance of trade, d) educate the people, and e) take other appropriate measures.
3. After achieving a stable government and establishing South Viet-Nam as an independent sovereign state, we should withdraw.

The United States should continue its present policy of cooperating in the conflict with the South Vietnamese while applying pressure against the Viet Cong and supplying all-out economic and social aid, aiming toward negotiations in an effort to overcome Communist aggression and to establish a viable and responsive government with popular support.

I. Economic and Social:

- A. The Vietnamese, in conjunction with the United States, should undertake an immediate study of potential export development. This study should include: 1) the possibility of industrializing major raw materials for foreign trade, and 2) the development of power resources to be used within Viet-Nam. (Modeled after the United States' T.V.A.)
The United States and the Vietnamese should do all that is possible to implement the results of this study, in cooperation with other existing organizations, such as the United Nations.
- B. A corps of individuals under armed protection should be sent to each South Vietnamese cultural area. These corps should consist of people from the United States, Viet-Nam, or other Asian countries, and they should be instructed in the following six areas: education, sanitation, health, engineering, agriculture, and political theory.

II. Political:

- A. We should advise the redistribution of authority of the government by increasing the importance and responsibility at the district level of administration.

- B. We advocate the strengthening of the civil service.
- C. We favor religious tolerance on the part of the South Vietnamese.
- D. It is hoped that in the near future a land reform program can be initiated to fit the needs and desires of the people.

III. Military:

- A. We advocate the strategic redirection of air attacks on North Vietnam in order to bring about economic paralysis by means of destroying key centers of communication, transportation (railway depots and bridges), and industry (defense).
- B. We favor military patrolling of the Cambodian-Laotian border, if it should prove feasible.
- C. We advocate a quarantine of the South Vietnamese coastline by the United States' Seventh Fleet.

COMMISSION G

The United States' foreign policy objectives in Southeast Asia should be (1) the containment of communism through the establishment of independent governments responsive to the people, with economic, political, and fiscal stability, (2) the promotion of economic cooperation among the several nations of Southeast Asia, and (3) specifically aiding the South Vietnamese in driving out the aggressors.

In Viet-Nam our military efforts should serve to boost morale, to "buy" time in order to implement further programs, and to divert and harass the aggressor. Strategic bombings should continue, cutting off supplies and forcing Hanoi to give second thought to the value of aggressive policies. The use of smaller counterinsurgency units could check infiltration and serve to establish village security. To the fullest extent native troops, who have been trained by United States advisors in the use of advanced weapons, should be employed to defend South Viet-Nam.

The short range goal of necessary economic and political reforms should be to discover the basic needs of the native populace and to fulfill these needs through the most expedient means acceptable to Vietnamese culture. Two commissions, economic and political, made up of non-military personnel, whose purpose is to gain the full support and confidence of the people, should be established. The economic commission would administer aid in raising the standards of living above subsistence level, in setting up medical clinics, and in instructing the Vietnamese in agricultural reform and vocational education. The political commission would provide advisors to work with Vietnamese volunteers in developing a national cause, and in improving communications and establishing stable local governments.

The long range economic and political goals in South Viet-Nam, integral parts of our long range goals throughout Southeast Asia, could be met by the establishment of a regional agency internationally financed and locally administered by teams of native and donor nation advisors for the development of natural resources, and improvement of trade, transportation, and communications.

Once the Viet Cong have been eliminated and a stable government established, the United States should recognize its commitment to uphold the independence of the new government.

Point of interest: The United States should be willing to discuss the cessation of any conflict in Southeast Asia, whether directly involved or not. In this light we considered the claim that the United States should establish diplomatic relations with Red China and recognize her as a legal government. Poll: 12 pro, 5 con, 1 abstention.

COMMISSION H

Self-determination and containment of Communism, with simultaneous nation building and the preservation and promotion of national and international integrity, are our goals in Vietnam. We propose that these goals can best be implemented by the following policies, realizing that emphasis will vary as situations change. We strongly believe that military action is not the final answer to our objectives; therefore, we propose increasing aid in socio-economic and political areas, as well as the military, by the following measures:

Military - (1) Offensive escalation of air strikes (Minority opinion: effective use of air strikes, not necessarily escalation); (2) Strangulation of supply lines below the 17th parallel; (3) South Vietnam and U.S. advisors pursuing a program to consolidate and extend areas in South Vietnam under South Vietnamese control; (4) Effective technical training of South Vietnamese soldiers; (5) Effort to mobilize the people.

Socio-economic - (1) Immediate supplies, where needed, to the South Vietnamese, in the form of food, clothing, and medical supplies; (2) Long range (begun immediately): a. training via domestic peace corp (National Voluntary Organization) with help from United States and cooperation from other Asian nations; b. providing schools, hospitals, and public works; c. increase in trade and investment.

A final resort, when feasible and necessary, would be a more enlightened administration of a strategic hamlet-type program, emphasizing cooperation and appropriate internal security measures.

As part of the development of self-help in Vietnam and in recognition of Vietnam as an important contributor to the development of Southeast Asia as an off-set to Communist China, the assistance and interest from other Asian nations should be encouraged. We also encourage the immediate regional development of the neighboring Southeast Asian countries.

Political- (1) Work with the present government in Saigon toward stabilization; (2) Initiate administrative and political training programs with the cooperation of the South Vietnamese government; (3) Encourage administrative reform; (4) Encourage the government to operate in ways familiar to the people, tolerant of all ethnic and religious groups; (5) Support the present policy of psychological operations through a program of propaganda designed toward winning the minds of the people and committee to promoting freedom and inspiring hope in both the Vietnamese and other people throughout the world.

We strongly encourage the involvement of the SEATO nations in these military, socio-economic, and political measures. Ultimately, we hope the United Nations will involve itself in these and similar programs.

COMMISSION "I"

The United States objective in South Viet-Nam should be: 1) to create stability (which does not necessarily imply that the country be pro-American, although desirable; however, it should not be anti-American.) This stability would enable eventual withdrawal. 2) to contain, or prevent the aggressive expansion of, Communism.

The enemy is an externally abetted revolutionary movement which has used nationalism as a vehicle to achieve its ends. The control center remains in Hanoi, supported by Red China and other Communist countries. Immediate withdrawal is not consistent with our objectives. We shall remain open to unconditional discussion with the possibility of future negotiations.

The commission emphasizes the interrelated nature of military, political, social and economic goals, and urges that the present policy be carried out more aggressively. Militarily, the United States should do whatever is necessary to isolate the Viet Cong, e.g., cutting off the flow of arms and men from North Viet-Nam. Strikes on selected targets in North Viet-Nam should be made on a continuing and increasing basis until the North Vietnamese completely discontinue their assistance to the guerrilla forces in South Viet-Nam. The following guidelines should apply to the United States' commitment:

- 1) the strikes on North Viet-Nam should be confined to military targets.
- 2) the South Vietnamese should continue to have the major responsibility to provide the ground forces for fighting the guerrillas in South Viet-Nam, and American ground forces should be used primarily for the purpose of defending American and South Vietnamese installations.
- 3) American air power should be used to the extent necessary to carry out the missions against military targets in North Viet-Nam and also to provide tactical support for ground forces fighting in South Viet-Nam.
- 4) the search, clear, and hold technique should be intensified. Areas freed from external aggression should be held through continued occupation by a sufficient number of troops.

Aid to South Viet-Nam in economic, social, and political areas should have a special emphasis on education. In determining how this aid can best be administered, multilateral and bilateral methods of aid were considered. A consensus showed that the United States should keep jurisdiction over military aid, but that political, social, and economic aid should be administered by bilateral panels with increased emphasis on multilateral participation. The following premises and condition should apply: 1) this program would be more acceptable to the national aspirations of the Vietnamese; 2) if efforts by multilateral aid are not effective the United States should assert leadership; 3) the stigma of colonialism might be lessened by this procedure.

COMMISSION J

I. Goal. The ultimate aim of our policy in South Viet-Nam is to stop Communist aggression and to establish a politically, economically, and socially stable government backed by the South Vietnamese people, which is favorable to the United States in its overall South-east Asian Policy.

II. Policy. A. Military. The United States should increase military assistance and active support in South Viet-Nam. This policy is intended to lead to negotiations between the U.S. with South Vietnamese support and agreement and North Viet-Nam. 1. Policy regarding air power: Employing as many Vietnamese personnel as possible rather than Americans, it is suggested that for the present, we increase the frequency and intensity of air attacks with the chief sources of supply as principle targets. The following steps should be taken in succession as the gravity of the situation warrants: a. Military targets including airports, staging points, naval bases, and radar stations. b. Communications including bridges, roads, harbors, railroads, and leading up to the ultimate destruction of the four main bridges across the Red River into Hanoi. c. Strategic light and heavy industry. 2. Policy regarding military aid: The number of United States military personnel in South Viet-Nam should be increased and more aid given to the South Vietnamese troops. American and South Vietnamese troops should work together employing other Southeast Asian troops when available. The following programs are suggested: a. To assist the reorganization and eventual enlargement of the Vietnamese army and police force. b. To establish a localized system of militarily defensible villages, making an effort to preserve popular support and sound economic footing. Defense of the hamlets should be relegated to localized Vietnamese mobile troop units and a special militia or minute man force from each village. 3. Policy regarding sea power: The establishment of a coastal naval blockade should be encouraged to prevent as much as possible enemy infiltration i.e., supplies and personnel.

B. Political. The United States should support a stable pro-American government in South Viet-Nam. Diplomatic support should encourage a climate of trust and mutual respect between the various power factions, including the Catholics, the Buddhists, and the military.

C. Economic and Social. Aid will be given for the development of the South Vietnamese economy aiming towards economic self-reliance. A combined commission of South Vietnamese and American experts should be established to decide how to distribute and most effectively utilize agricultural, industrial, educational, and technical aid to the South Vietnamese people, working through the government. A voluntary youth corps would be established to implement the commission's plan throughout the defensible villages, but it will concentrate its efforts in Saigon and work out from this point to encompass all of South Viet-Nam.

D. Negotiations. The U.S. will consider negotiations at any time but will not come to terms until North Viet-Nam is willing to accept the following: 1. Withdrawal of aid to Viet Cong. 2. Return of North Vietnamese infiltrators above the 17th parallel. 3. Joint border control, joint investigations of border incidents and the formation of a neutral zone. 4. A return to the policy of the Geneva accord of 1954. 5. The United States will remain in South Viet-Nam in its current military capacity until all elements of the Viet Cong are suppressed and the government has become stabilized and no longer needs or requires United States military and political aid.

COMMISSION K

In formulating its policy for South Viet-Nam, the United States must consider the three following goals: one, to halt Communist expansion in South Viet-Nam; two, to stabilize the government there; three, to raise the standard of living in the country and to fulfill the basic needs of the people.

To achieve these aims, our policy should take a three-pronged approach--military, political, and socio-economic. These are interrelated aspects of one policy, and they often occur simultaneously. Thus they are not meant to be listed in any preferential or chronological order.

Military

First, our military policy must stop the flow of men and materials to the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam, by the strangling of sea routes, and by air strikes on land routes and on strategic sites, excluding industrial complexes at the present time. In these attacks any possible destruction of the North Viet Nameese population should be avoided.

Secondly, our policy must stop the terrorism and guerrilla control in South Viet-Nam; it must destroy the influence, support and fear of the Cong; and it must psychologically reassure the people by our determined and consistent military support.

Thirdly, in order for the uprooting of the Viet Cong to be effective, we must pursue the enemy till their destruction or dispersement. As soon as an area had been militarily secured against the Viet Cong, the socio-economic measures may go into effect.

Socio-economic

Our policy here is to encourage the government of South Viet-Nam to establish a more diversified economy with financial and advisory aid from the United States. To accomplish this policy, we should recommend to the South Vietnamese the following measures: one, development of education, such as the training of leaders, especially in the fields of politics, business, industry, and health; two, technical aid, such as the learning of better agricultural techniques, and the development of the Mekong River; three, development of communication and transportation systems; and four, the development of economic associations with other non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia in conjunction with foreign investment leading to capital formation for the purpose of fostering economic development.

Political

In this third prong of policy the United States should encourage the South Vietnamese in establishing a unified national

COMMISSION K--continued

government, and should continue to give advice as long as it is requested, with emphasis in the areas of land reform, policing, and communications. This is aimed at establishing a sense of rapport among the present administrators, future leaders, and the people of the country.

The United States is willing to participate in unconditional discussion, with the possibility of its leading to negotiation with North Viet-Nam regarding the withdrawal of North Vietnamese economic and military aid to the Viet Cong. The minority opinion states that the United States is willing to participate in unconditional discussion, with the possibility of its leading to negotiation.

Long-range Objective

This entire policy is aimed at the long-range goal of giving the South Vietnamese self-sufficiency, so that we can eventually withdraw our aid, both military and financial.

COMMISSION L

The ultimate goals of the following proposed policy are 1). peace in Southeast Asia 2). the establishment of a stable (representative) government in South Viet-Nam that will make it a free and an independent state and 3). the halt of Communist-inspired aggression.

The most essential and immediate element of this policy is the military. Basically it consists of continuing our effort in South Viet-Nam and is implemented by the following suggestions for U.S. actions: 1). Contribute the necessary number of American troops to an international force whose purpose would be to seal off to the greatest degree possible all borders of South Viet-Nam on land and sea. 2). Continue limited air strikes on strategic supply dumps and lines. 3). Limited hit and run raids above the 17th parallel as a ground maneuver to eliminate supply lines. 4). A systematic village by village defeat through demilitarization of the Viet Cong by employing South Vietnamese troops both in liberating and as a police force regulating the villages.

The social and economic reform, designed to encourage and foster self-determination among the South Vietnamese, has been entitled the "Village team plan," which immediately follows the demilitarization. These teams are diversified groups of men, the majority of which are South Vietnamese, and which should contain at least one American. The teams, assigned to specific districts are advisors who, working on the local level, dissuade the villagers from communism while developing programs of teaching the training. These programs consider areas of military preparedness, agriculture, educational and social reforms. In addition, this plan embraces sufficient financial aid in the form of limited supplies as needed.

On a national scope, the policy establishes contact between the South Vietnamese government and United States advisors on two levels: 1). the aid is channeled through administrative advisors and thence to the "village teams" to be distributed as needed. 2). Guidance is made available to the government in the form of a politician advisor or advisory board to be used at the disposal of the head of state.

After the above provisions have been instituted, considerable attention is shifted to the internal development of South Vietnamese resources, agricultural, industrial and the development of the Mekong River Valley. These would constitute a process aiding the stabilization of the country.

Encouraging educational development through the exchange of student leaders and through more teacher education with the hope of setting up a greater number of permanent schools also figures in the long range policy.

Finally, the United States should encourage capital investment in, and trade with, South Viet-Nam, aiming for eventual economic redevelopment.

COMMISSION M

OVERALL OBJECTIVES IN VIET-NAM ARE:

1. To stop Communist aggression in Southeast Asia
2. That South Viet-Nam be an independent nation which is strong and stable politically, economically, and socially.
3. That the United States should attempt to enhance its standing and prestige with Southeast Asian governments.
4. That South Viet-Nam have a friendly, pro-Western government.

Present United States foreign policy in Viet-Nam shall be directed towards:

- (1) ending North Vietnamese support of Viet-Cong operations in South Viet-Nam.
- (2) providing political, military, social, and economic measures to strengthen the government of South Viet-Nam.

The means for achieving the first point of our policy as stated above is negotiation with North Viet-Nam. (Negotiation is herein defined as meeting with another nation in order to make a decision.) The objective of our negotiation would be to end war as directed and supplied by North Viet-Nam, and we will not enter negotiations until we are assured of obtaining our negotiations.

To bring North Viet-Nam to the negotiation table, increased and increasingly effective air strikes would be mounted against North Viet-Nam on such targets as military bases, supply depots, industrial complexes, and routes of supply and communication, avoiding destruction of population centers, dikes, and crops wherever possible.

To achieve negotiation from a position of strength, we do not commit ourselves to:

- (1) large-scale involvement of United States troops in combat in North Viet-Nam.
- (2) nuclear war

unless there is a drastic threat to the United States' interest or a full-scale attack by North Viet-Nam or Red China upon South Viet-Nam.

After the policies outlined above have been employed and it becomes evident that the North Vietnamese will not negotiate, it is recognized that certain concessions must follow.* However, if the military situation should deteriorate to a level where the collapse of the South Vietnamese war effort proves imminent, American troops should be free to engage directly but temporarily if possible in the war effort.

The United States shall continue the practice of the oilspot concept. This involves an ever-increasing extension of South Vietnamese control throughout the countryside begun from firmly established bases of operation.

We shall use jointly trained** South Vietnamese in a "tam cung" policy to win the friendship and support of the villagers.

We shall organize and actively support local resistance to Viet-Cong terrorism at the village level. We will also employ guerilla tactics using jointly trained South Vietnamese.

We shall follow a policy of limited hot pursuit against the Viet-Cong. (Limited: to the extent that it not needlessly complicate the international situation.)

COMMISSION M (continued)

The United States will support any government in Saigon which is reasonable favorable to our objectives. Our present economic and military aid will be dependent on the existence of such a government. We will take reasonable measures to insure that a government unfavorable to our interests will not gain control.

Realizing the importance of strong "rice-roots" groups in the defeat of the Viet-Cong, the United States will encourage and support efficient village governments that have popular support.

In order to build up mutual trust between the United States and the Vietnamese people, an organization consisting of American and South Vietnamese volunteers would be developed along the following lines:

- (1) Americans would instruct South Viet-Nam in practical solutions to the problems of sanitation, health, education and agriculture.
- (2) Vietnamese would instruct the Americans in their language, customs, and cultural diversities.

The United States should help to establish an atmosphere conducive to foreign investment as soon as there is enough stability in this country to permit larger-scale domestic programs. We will also bolster the piastre.

The United States will adopt a program of economic aid for non-aggressive nations. At this time, North Viet-Nam and Indonesia are considered aggressive nations.

**using Vietnamese and U.S. instructors.

*Minority opinion:

We should make no concessions in any realm, since our objective is to negotiate only from a position of power. Anything less, including the bribing of North Viet-Nam to the conference table, would be an indication of weakness and end in unnecessary loss of advantage and prestige. Past experience has indicated that the Communists do not uphold their part of the negotiation unless forced to do so through confrontation by a policy of strength.

Further discussion should be given to possible concession that if necessary would be made to North Vietnamese at the conference table. For instance, the proposed program of economic aid to Southeast Asia could be made to encompass North Viet-Nam.